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HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD: THE 
FUNCTIONAL CASE FOR FOREIGN 




Handed down on the last day of the 2005 Term, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld1 was the most 
eagerly anticipated decision of the year. The Court's decision 
garnered banner headline treatment in The New York Times and 
Washington Post, and initial reactions of legal commentators 
emphasized the decision's historic significance. One prominent 
commentator has even called Hamdan "the most im~ortant deci-
sion on presidential power and the rule of law ever." 
While Hamdan is an important decision, it is doubtful that 
the Court's opinion will have the long-term significance of a 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawye? or United States v. 
Nixon.4 Unlike Youngstown or Nixon, Hamdan largely avoided 
momentous questions of constitutional separation of powers. 
Rather, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court invalidating mili-
tary commissions rested solely on the interpretation of three 
kinds of non-constitutional law: federal statutes relating to mili-
tary justice, treaties relating to the treatment of military detain-
ees, and the customary international laws of war. The non-
constitutional basis for the Hamdan decision means that Con-
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1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
2. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Conversation, SLATE, June 29, 
2006, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2144476/entry/2144825/. 
3. 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
4. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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gress may reinstate pre-Hamdan military commissions by simply 
passing a statute that more explicitly approves them. Congress 
large\Y did this when it enacted the Military Commissions Act of 
2006. 
This is not to say Hamdan has no jurisprudential signifi-
cance. As a formal matter, Justice Stevens's opinion for the 
Court not only departed substantially from past judicial prece-
dents supporting the use of military commissions, but it also 
failed to defer to the executive's reasonable interpretations of 
the relevant statutes, treaties, and customary international law 
on war. Despite longstanding judicial recognition of a duty to de-
fer to the executive's reasonable interpretations in the foreign 
affairs and warmaking arena, the Court as a whole did not justify 
its failure to give such deference. This non-deference, we argue, 
is the most surprising and disturbing aspect of the Court's deci-
sion. 
The doctrines requiring judicial deference to executive in-
terpretations of laws affecting foreign affairs, especially during 
wartime, have a solid and undisputed formal pedigree. But these 
doctrines also have a strong functional basis. The executive 
branch has strong institutional advantages over courts in the in-
terpretation of laws relating to the conduct of war. Hamdan's re-
fusal to give deference to the executive branch, if followed in the 
future, will further disrupt the traditional system of political co-
operation between Congress and the President in wartime. It will 
raise the transaction costs for policymaking during war without 
any serious benefit and potentially at large cost. Congress ex-
pressed its displeasure with Hamden by stripping federal courts 
of jurisdiction and reducing their interpretive freedom over for-
eign affairs statutes and international law. 
This paper proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we criticize the 
formal basis for the Court's decision in Hamdan, especially its 
failure to follow doctrines requiring deference to executive in-
terpretations of foreign affairs laws. In Part II, we offer a func-
tional justification for deference doctrines based on the execu-
tive's comparative institutional advantages over the federal 
judiciary in the conduct of foreign affairs, especially in times of 
war. Finally, in Part III, we discuss the consequences of Hamdan 
on cooperation between the President and Congress in the con-
duct of this and future wars. 
5. Pub. L. No. 109-366 (signed by President Bush on October 17, 2006). 
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I. 
This Part critiques the formal basis for Hamdan's rejection 
of the use of military commissions to try enemy combatants in 
the war on terrorism. Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court did 
not identify a constitutional defect in the military commission 
system established by the President's November 13, 2001 execu-
tive order.6 Rather, the Court's holding rested solely on its inter-
pretation of two forms of non-constitutionallaw: federal statutes 
relating to military justice and federal treaties governing the 
treatment of wartime detainees. Justice Stevens also found that 
the commission violated the customary international law of war, 
but he lost Justice Kennedy's vote on that portion of the opinion. 
This Part argues that these arguments were unpersuasive on 
formal grounds, especially in light of past judicial precedents on 
military commissions. The Court's approach is even less persua-
sive when considered in light of well-settled doctrines requiring 
judicial deference to executive interpretations of statutes relat-
ing to foreign affairs, treaties, and customary international law. 
A. HAMDAN'S CASCADE OF ERRORS 
On September 11, 2001, members of the al Qaeda terrorist 
organization crashed two civilian airliners into the World Trade 
Center in New York City, a third into the Pentagon in Arlington, 
Virginia, while a fourth headed toward Washington, D.C., crash-
ing in Pennsylvania due to the resistance of the passengers. Ap-
proximately 3,000 civilians were killed, billions of dollars in 
property destroyed, and the nation's transportation and financial 
systems were temporarily closed. In part, the United States re-
sponded by sending forces to Afghanistan, where the ruling 
Taliban militia had harbored al Qaeda for several years. 
An important aspect of the war on terrorism focuses on the 
detention and trial of captured al Qaeda members. Military 
commissions try captured members of the enemy for violations 
of the laws of war. American generals have used military com-
missions from the Revolutionary war through World War IC 
They are not created by the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
6. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
7. For a critical review of the history, see LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS & 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005) 
(hereinafter FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS). 
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(UCMJ), which governs courts-martial,8 but instead have been 
established by Presidents and military commanders in the field. 
In a November 13, 2001 order, President Bush established mili-
tary commissions to try members of al Qaeda. Bush's military 
commissions apply to any individual for whom there is "reason 
to believe" is or "was a member of the organization known as al 
Qaida" and has engaged in or ~lanned to commit terrorist at-
tacks against the United States. Al Qaeda had carried out at-
tacks on the United States which had "created a state of armed 
conflict." 10 
Military commissions traditionally had operated according 
to the customary international law of war. They did not have a 
specific code of procedure, nor did they punish a statutory listing 
of offenses. Procedures were flexible to accommodate the de-
mands of warfare, and crimes were those recognized by a com-
mon law of war which was not reduced to a single text. Under 
President Bush's military order, the Defense Department exer-
cised delegated authority to issue two lengthy codes, one defin-
ing the elements of the crimes triable by commission, the other 
setting out the procedures. The Defense Department's regula-
tions, for example, set the standard for conviction at proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt and provide defense counsel with ac-
cess to exculpatory evidence in the hands of the prosecution. 
They also recognize the right against self-incrimination and the 
right of cross-examination, and require a unanimous vote of the 
commission members for the death penalty. 11 Similarly, the De-
fense Department's articulation of the crimes subject to trial by 
military commission went well beyond past practice, such as 
FDR's definition of the jurisdiction of military commissions as 
8. See 10 U .S.C. § 821 (2000) ("The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdic· 
tion upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other 
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by 
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals."). 
9. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non·Citizens in the War Against Terrorism§ 2(a)(1)(i)-(ii), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at 57,833. 
The order also applies to those who knowingly harbor al Qaeda members who plan to 
commit terrorist attacks against the United States. /d. § 2(a)(1)(iii). 
10. /d. § 1(a). 
11. See Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commissions, 32 C.F.R. 11.3 
(2006); U.S. Dep't of Defense, Mil. Comm'n Order No.1, Procedures for Trials by Mil. 
Comm'ns of Certain Non-U.S. Citizens in the War Against Terrorism paras. 5-6 (Mar. 21, 
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news!Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf [herein-
after Mil. Comm'n Order No.1]. 
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reaching "sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or viola-
tions of the law of war." 12 
The Court's analysis began by finding that military commis-
sions must comply with procedural requirements set forth in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, a federal statute codifying 
rules governing military justice in the United States. 13 The Court 
focused its analysis on two UCMJ provisions-Articles 21 14 and 
3615 -which it then interpreted to constrain and prohibit Presi-
dent Bush's use of military commissions. 
1. Article 36's "practicability" and "uniformity" 
requirement 
Article 36 of the UCMJ authorizes the President to issue 
regulations governing the "procedures, including modes of 
proof, for cases arising under [the UCMJ] triable in courts-
martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and 
procedures for courts of inquiry." 16 When making such regula-
tions, the President "shall, so far as he considers practicable, ap-
ply the principles of law and the rules of evidence" generally 
used in civilian criminal trials in federal courts. Article 36 also 
requires that the rules and regulations be "uniform insofar as 
practicable." 
Article 36's plain language delegates to the President a 
broad authority to "determine" the procedural rules governing 
military commissions. Nevertheless, the Court interpreted Arti-
cle 36 to require the President to make a finding explaining why 
12. Take, for example, the Bush Department of Defense effort to define spying: 
(6) Spying-(i) Elements. (A) The accused collected or attempted to collect 
certain information; 
(B) The accused intended to convey such information to the enemy; 
(C) The accused, in collecting or attempting to collect the information, was 
lurking or acting clandestinely, while acting under false pretenses; and 
(D) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with armed 
conflict. 
(ii) Comments. (A) Members of a military organization not wearing a disguise 
and others who carry out their missions openly are not spies, if, though they 
may have resorted to concealment, they have not acted under false pretenses. 
(B) Related to the requirement that conduct be wrongful or without justifica-
tion or excuse in this case is the fact that, consistent with the law of war, a lawful 
combatant who, after rejoining the armed force to which that combatant be-
longs, is subsequently captured, can not be punished for previous acts of espio-
nage. His successful rejoining of his armed force constitutes a defense. 
68 C.F.R. 11.6 (2006). 
13. 10 u.s.c.s. §§ 801-947 (2006). 
14. 10 u.s.c.s. § 821 (2006). 
15. 10 u .s.c.s. § 836 (2006). 
16. 10 U.S.C.S. § 836(a) (2006). 
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it is not "practicable" to use courts-martial instead of military 
commissions. No practice revealed in any legislative history, sub-
sequent congressional enactments, or presidential decisions, 
seems to support this requirement. 
President Bush's November 2001 order finding that using 
civilian criminal trials against unlawful enemy combatants was 
impracticable, the Court held, may satisfy Article 36(a).17 But 
the Court required the President to make another official de-
termination explaining the impracticability of using court-martial 
procedures. It doubted that such a determination could be sus-
tained. "Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it 
would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case. 
There is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in 
securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in apply-
ing the usual principles of relevance and admissibility." 18 Simi-
larly, the Court found a rule permitting a military commission to 
exclude a defendant from a hearing involving classified informa-
tion "cannot lightly be excused as 'practicable.",~ 9 
Hamdan's interpretation of Article 36 does not square with 
the Supreme Court's treatment of military commissions during 
World War II in Ex parte Quirin20 and In re Yamashita. 21 In 
Quirin, the Court rejected challenges to the military commission 
used to try the Nazi saboteurs. It did not suggest that FDR's 
procedures in those commissions had to resemble those for 
courts-martial, but instead limited its review to whether the 
commission could properly exercise jurisdiction over the case, 
and went no farther. It certainly did not demand that FDR issue 
rules that were consistent with those for courts-martial, or make 
a sufficient showing of impracticability as to individual commis-
sion procedures. Yamashita also refused to exercise any review 
over military commission procedures, but instead limited its in-
quiry to whether the military commission properly exercised ju-
risdiction. Neither decision claimed that the President's proce-
dures for military commissions had to follow court-martial 
procedures. 
Hamdan rejected its earlier precedent on the ground that 
Article 36 was enacted after World War II to change the rules 
used in military commissions. Article 36, however, does not ap-
17. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2791 (2006). 
18. I d. at 2792. 
19. ld. 
20. 317 u.s. 1 (1942). 
21. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
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pear to do anything of the sort. It vests the authority to issue 
procedures for military commissions to the President. It requires 
that the procedures and principles mirror civilian courts so far as 
practicable. Neither of these provisions required the President to 
use the procedural rules of courts-martial; if anything, they at-
tempt to impose the standards of civilian courts, but gave the 
President the discretion to opt out of them. Hamdan based its 
holding instead on the third element of Article 36, that "all rules 
and regulations . . . shall be uniform insofar as practicable. "22 
This provides a thin textual basis for requiring military commis-
sion procedures to conform to courts-martial. Again, this pro-
vided the "practicable" exception, but it also does not make 
clear whether the rules and regulations must be uniform be-
tween different types of military tribunals. It could just as easily 
be read to mean that the rules and regulations must be uniform 
within each tribunal system-military commissions, for example, 
did not operate according to a common set of procedures in 
World War II. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, the 
uniformity requirement appears to have referred to uniformity 
between different military services because the broad statutory 
purpose of the UCMJ was to unify the rules governing the Army 
and the Navy.23 
As the Court conceded, Article 36(a) delegates broad au-
thority to create procedures for military commissions to the 
President and to determine the practicability of departures from 
civilian criminal procedures. The Court even assumed that 
"complete deference" was owed to President Bush's determina-
tion that civilian trials were impracticable. But the Court gave no 
deference to the President's procedural rulemaking in Hamdan's 
case because Article 36(b) uses the phrase "insofar as practica-
ble" rather than Article 36(a)'s "so far as he considers practica-
ble." Hamdan provided no evidence to show that courts, Con-
gress, or the executive branch had previously believe~. this 
difference in language to herald a tectonic shift in the attitude of 
deference toward the executive branch, particularly over matters 
involving war. 
The Court's refusal to give deference to the President's in-
terpretation of his delegated rulemaking authority stands in 
sharp contrast with the broad deference regularly given to the 
presidential interpretations in other kinds of rulemaking. In-
22. 10 U.S.C.S. § 836(b) (2006). 
23. Hamdan, 126 U.S. at 2842 (Thomas, 1., dissenting). 
186 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:179 
deed, Justice Stevens's opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council adopted a broad rule requiring judicial defer-
ence to agency interpretations of law, even where the statute 
contained no specific language grantin5 the President or agency 
the power to interpret or "determine." 4 Yet the Court summa-
rily rejected the President's determination here, despite the fact 
that it was made pursuant to a specific statutory delegation of 
power and involved the exercise of his core constitutionally 
delegated powers as Commander in Chief.25 As we will explain 
in part II, this result conflicted with functional and historical rea-
sons for the practice of judicial deference to executive branch 
decisions in wartime. 
2. Section 821 (Article 21) and the "law of war" 
In addition to finding that President Bush's military com-
mission procedures failed to comply with Article 36, the Court 
found that Article 21 of the UCMJ limits military commission 
jurisdiction to cases in compliance with the law of war. Article 21 
is titled "Jurisdiction of courts-martial not exclusive."26 It de-
clares that 
[t]he provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon 
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost 
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction 
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the 
law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost 
h "1" "b 1 27 courts, or ot er m1 1tary tn una s. 
Although Article 21's plain language is mainly concerned 
with preserving the concurrent jurisdiction of military commis-
sions and other military tribunals, the Court construed Article 21 
to condition any such military commission trials on compliance 
with the law of war. This is an odd reading. Article 21's text re-
fers to the law of war to mark out the jurisdiction of military 
commissions. There is no indication that Article 21 was intended 
to regulate the procedures and operations of military commis-
sions once jurisdiction was established. 
The Court, however, read Article 21 to require that military 
commissions follow the laws of war in regard to their procedures 
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
25. For discussion of the application of Chevron to foreign affairs, see Curtis A 
Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000). 
26. 10 u.s.c.s. § 821 (2006). 
27. !d .. 
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and the elements of the substantive crimes charged. The Court 
held that the phrase "law of war" incorporated two sources of 
international law into U.S. law: the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
particularly focusing on the third Geneva Convention regulatinR 
the treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Hague Conventions. 
But the Court's heavy reliance on the Geneva Conventions sug-
gests that it failed to understand that much of the law of war re-
mains customary. There is no international agreement, for ex-
ample, which defines the elements of criminal violations of the 
laws of war. Rather, that common law is composed of treaties 
(such as the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions, 
and the Statute of Rome establishing the International Criminal 
Court), state practice (such as domestic criminal legislation de-
fining and punishing war crimes), and judicial decisions (such as 
the opinions of the Nuremburg Tribunal or the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). Indeed, the Ge-
neva Conventions explicitly describe themselves as "complemen-
tary" to some of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Hague 
Regulations, in turn, explicitly incorporate customary law.29 The 
Court's construction of the phrase "law of war,",therefore, 
should have surveyed all of these materials as well as American 
practice itself because the United States has perhaps been in-
volved in the most armed conflicts since World War II. Although 
Justice Stevens did consider these broader sources of law in his 
plurality opinion on the law of war's treatment of conspiracy, his 
opinion for the Court relied almost exclusively on the Geneva 
Conventions to give content to the law of war. 
a. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
As an initial matter, the Court had to confront the argument 
that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable. In-
deed, the Court's own prior decision in Johnson v. Eisentrage?0 
squarely held that the Geneva Conventions could not be en-
forced in domestic courts. German soldiers, convicted by mili-
tary commission for continuing to fight in China after the end of 
28. Hamdan, 126 U.S. at 2780-81 (plurality opinion). The Court focused on the 
Third Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
29. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra 
note 28, art. 135, 6 U.S.T. at 3422, 75 U.N.T.S. at 240 (describing Third Geneva Conven-
tion as "complementary" to regulations in Hague Convention respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land); Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,36 Stat. 2277. 
30. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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the war with Germany, claimed that their trial violated the Ge-
neva Conventions. Eisentrager found that the 1929 Geneva Con-
ventions, which were largely identical to the 1949 Conventions, 
placed the "responsibility for observance and enforcement of 
these rights ... upon political and military authorities" only.31 
Hamdan found that Eisentrager did not control because "com-
pliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the au-
thority set forth in Article 21 is granted. "32 
The Court must have assumed either that Article 21 of the 
UCMJ had effectively overruled Eisentrager, or that the 1949 
Geneva Conventions called for domestic judicial enforcement in 
a way that the 1929 Conventions did not. The enforceability of 
the Geneva Conventions could not have resulted from any 
change in Article 21 itself. When Eisentrager was decided, the 
statutory predecessor to Article 21 contained exactly the same 
language regarding "the law of war. "33 Thus, when the Eisen-
trager Court held that the Geneva Conventions were not judi-
cially enforceable, military commissions were already bound by 
statute to comply with the laws of war. Eisentrager did not find 
that the laws of war, incorporated through Article 21, required 
anything more than an inquiry into whether the military com-
mission properly exercised jurisdiction over the defendants. 
Even if the Court believed that the new Article 21 was in-
tended to override Eisentrager, events could not have happened 
that way. Congress enacted the UCMJ, and Section 821's un-
changed recognition of military commissions, on May 5, 1950. It 
would have been impossible for Congress to have understood 
that the UCMJ overruled Eisentrager and made the Geneva 
Conventions judicially enforceable in domestic courts because 
Eisentrager was not decided until June 5, 1950. In other words, 
Congress could not have understood the UCMJ to reject Eisen-
trager's rule on the non-enforceability of the Geneva Conven-
tions, because Eisentrager did not announce its rule until after 
Congress had enacted the new U CMJ. 
If Section 821 did not change, then the Geneva Conventions 
must have changed. The majority, however, was unable to show 
that the 1949 Geneva Conventions reversed the rule of the 1929 
Conventions-enforcement was still to come from political or 
military channels. There was no textual difference indicating that 
31. !d. at 789 n.l4. 
32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794 (2006). 
33. See 10 U.S.C. 1486 (1946) (Article 15 is the predecessor provision). 
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those who negotiated, signed, or ratified the treaties on behalf of 
the United States believed the 1949 agreements to be self-
executing. No federal court had ever held that the 1949 treaties 
were self-executing.34 The executive branch, which generally in-
terprets international law on behalf of the United States, had 
never interpreted the 1949 Conventions to be self-executing ei-
ther. Without some signal from the political branches, federal 
courts usually have not interpreted international agreements to 
bestow judicially-enforceable individual rights.35 
i. "[Cjonflict not of an international character" 
Having found that Article 21 incorporated the Geneva 
Conventions, the Court held that Common Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions applied to the U.S. conflict with al Qaeda, 
even though al Qaeda is not a signatory to the treaties. The 
Court concluded that the war with al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
(where Hamdan was captured) qualifies as a "conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties."36 Because Afghanistan is a "High 
Contracting Party" to the Geneva Conventions, the Court held 
that Hamdan was entitled to the protection of Common Article 
3, which prohibits the humiliating and degrading treatment of 
detainees and requires the use of "regularly constituted court[ s] 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples. "37 The Geneva Conventions 
themselves do not define any of these obviously ambiguous 
terms. 
The government, however, had argued that the war withAl 
Qaeda did not fall into the category of a "conflict not of an in-
ternational character." On February 7, 2002, President Bush had 
determined that al Qaeda detainees were not legally entitled to 
34. One federal court did apply the Geneva Conventions on the assumption that 
they were judicially enforceable, although the issue of self-execution was not raised and 
the defendant himself was found to have no remedies under the Conventions. See United 
States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1525-29 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
35. For discussion of the non·self-execution issue, see John C. Yoo, Treaties and 
Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2218 (1999); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constiwtion: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999). For a differ-
ent view, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Under-
standing, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999); 
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999). 
36. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795. 
37. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, surpa note 
28, at art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-37. 
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prisoner of war status because al Qaeda had not signed the Ge-
neva Conventions nor voluntarily accepted its obligations.38 Yet, 
al Qaeda fighters did not fall within Common Article 3, which 
the administration read as applying only to internal civil wars. 
The government argued that the war with al Qaeda stretched far 
beyond Afghanistan and was a quintessentially international, 
rather than localized, conflict.39 The D.C. Circuit agreed with 
this position.40 
The Court rejected this interpretation. Citing Jeremy Ben-
tham for support, it argued that international "bears its literal 
meaning" as referring only to matters between nations.41 It 
treated Common Article 3 as a general catch-all provision, in-
cluding all armed conflicts not involving clashes between na-
tions. Although it acknowledged that the commentaries written 
at the time of the Geneva Conventions' drafting suggested oth-
erwise, the Hamdan majority relied on changes to Common Ar-
ticle 3's text during the drafting process and upon developments 
in the laws of war post-ratification. 
The Court's reasoning here was weak. While Bentham was 
one of the first writers to conceive of "international" law, rather 
than the law of nations, the Court presented no reason to think 
that this understanding was held by those who drafted or ratified 
the 1949 Conventions. Such a reading would not comport with 
modern understandings of "international" today, which extends 
beyond "between nations" to include matters of global scope or 
affairs that go beyond the borders of a single nation. "Interna-
tional" human rights law would be an oxymoron under the 
Hamdan majority's definition, as would the regulation of global 
commons, such as the space and the seas, under "international" 
environmental law. Nor did the Court identify any materials 
from a primary touchstone for the interpretation of treaties- the 
understandings of the treaty text held by the President and Sen-
ate at the time of the latter's advice and consent-which sup-
ported its reading of Common Article 3.42 The drafters of the 
38. Memorandum on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees from 
George Bush, U.S. President (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-srv/nationldocuments/020702bush.pdf. 
39. For a discussion of the administration's reasoning, sec John C. Yoo & James C. 
Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003). 
40. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
41. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796. 
42. For discussion of the method of interpreting treaties, see John Yoo, THE 
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, 
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Geneva Conventions would have had the Spanish or Chinese 
civil wars in mind in expanding protections to conflicts "not of 
an international character." Thinking on the law of war at that 
time simply had not developed to the point where it could con-
sider the status of conflicts fought by non-state actors such as al 
Qaeda. Finally, the Court ignored subsequent executive branch 
decisions, which rejected amendments to the Geneva Conven-
tions, known as the 1977 Additional Protocols, that would have 
extended certain Geneva Convention protections to non-state 
actors such as terrorist groups.43 The fact that the drafters of the 
Geneva Conventions would have felt a need to add protocols in 
order to encompass non-state actors like terrorist groups 
strongly suggests that the original Geneva Conventions did not 
apply to such groups. 
ii. "Regularly constituted court" 
The Court faced one final interpretive obstacle to finding 
Hamdan's military commission invalid. Common Article 3 re-
quires that Hamdan be tried by a "regularly constituted court af-
fording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples. "44 The Court construed the phrase 
"regular?' constituted courts" to require the use of courts-
martial.4 Military commissions might qualify as "regularly con-
stituted courts" only if such commissions complied with Article 
21's practicability and uniformity requirements. In this way, the 
Court was able to use its interpretation of Article 21 to give sub-
stance to its interpretation of Common Article 3. 
But as Justice Alito pointed out in his separate dissent, the 
phrase "regularly constituted court" is more naturally construed 
to require that the "court be appointed or established in accor-
dance with the appointing country's domestic law. "46 Given the 
majority's own admission that military commissions had long 
been established or appointed by the President pursuant to ex-
ecutive orders and recognized by federal statute, the military 
ch. 7 (2005) (hereinafter YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE). 
43. See Message from George W. Bush, President, U.S., to the U.S. Senate (Jan. 29, 
1987), reprinted in 133 Cong. Rec. S1428 (1987) (rejecting Protocol II Additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
44. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 
28, 6 U.S.T. at 3320,75 U.N.T.S. at 136--37. 
45. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797. 
46. See id. at 2850 (Ali to, J., dissenting). 
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commissions seem to satisfy Common Article 3's "regularly con-
stituted court" requirement. Any problem with the procedures 
applied by the military commission does not speak to the manner 
in which the court was constituted. At the very least, the Court's 
interpretation of "regularly constituted" departed from that 
phrase's natural meaning. Nor did the Court offer any case law 
from other courts interpreting this phrase, evidence from the of-
ficial commentaries, or other extrinsic sources to support its in-
terpretation. 
b. The Customary International Law ofWar 
Four members of the Court had an even more fundamental 
objection to Hamdan's military commission trial. According to 
these four Justices, the government's charge against Hamdan for 
conspiring to commit the September 11,2001 attacks is not a vio-
lation of the law of war. Because conspiracy is not recognized as 
a violation of the law of war, the four Justices held, Hamdan 
could not be validly tried by a military commission. 
Justice Kennedy's refusal to join these portions of this opin-
ion by Justice Stevens deprived this view of a majority. But the 
Stevens opinion still is worth discussing because it illustrates how 
at least four members of the Court have asserted broad authority 
to interpret (and reject) presidential interpretations of the cus-
tomary international law relating to the conduct of war. 
Hamdan was charged with participating in a conspiracy ex-
tending from 1996 to November 2001 to attack the United States 
on September 11, 2001. As the plurality noted, none of the overt 
acts Hamdan was alleged to have committed occurred in a thea-
ter of war nor did any occur on any date after September 11, 
2001.47 According to the plurality, violations of the law of war 
require activity in a war zone and after the conflict has actually 
begun. The Court found that the conflict with Al-Qaeda did not 
begin until September 11,2001.48 
47. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2785. 
48. This determination itself is controversial given the case law suggests that the 
question of whether a state of war has been authorized by Congress is a political ques-
tion. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26,34 (1st Cir. 1971) ("All we hold here is that 
in a situation of prolonged but undeclared hostilities, where the executive continues to 
act not only in the absence of any conflicting congressional claim of authority but with 
steady congressional support, the Constitution has not been breached."); Orlando v. 
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (concluding that whether the Vietnam conflict 
required a declaration of war was a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d 
Cir. 1970) (denying a preliminary injunction against dispatch of a soldier to Vietnam be-
cause whether Congress had authorized a conflict was a political question). 
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Justice Stevens also argued for a high standard of accep-
tance before recognizing violations of the law of war. "When ... 
neither the elements of the offense nor the range of permissible 
punishments is defined by statute or treaty, the precedent must 
be plain and unambiguous. "49 Although conspiracy had some-
times been tried in law-of-war courts in the U.S., it had never 
been the sole basis for a military court's jurisdiction. 
This standard for recognizing a violation of the law of war 
departs substantially from the Court's prior precedents. In In re 
Yamashita, for instance, the Court upheld a conviction (and exe-
cution) of a Japanese commander for war crimes despite sub-
stantial doubts over whether he had been properly charged with 
a violation of the law of war. 5° The new Stevens standard resem-
bles the Court's more recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, requiring broad and universal acceptance before a fed-
eral coErt could recognize a violation of customary international 
law.51 
If Justice Stevens was applying the difficult Sosa standard in 
the analysis of conspiracy as a law of war violation, it is strange 
that he utterly failed to apply that high standard to his other ma-
jor interpretation of customary international law. In another part 
of his opinion that Justice Kennedy refused to join, Justice Ste-
vens held the right of an accused to be privy to all of the evi-
dence against him is an "indisputabl[ e] part of customary inter-
national law."52 But rather than conduct the kind of searching, 
skeptical inquiry into the status of this right under customary in-
ternational law demanded by both Sosa and Stevens's own 
analysis of conspiracy, Justice Stevens merely cited to Article 75 
of the Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and a number of 
U.S. cases endorsing the importance of this right. None of the 
U.S. cases claim to be expounding a rule of customary interna-
tional law, and most seem to be explicating the U.S. constitu-
tional right which Justice Stevens did not claim applied here. Ar-
ticle 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions does provide 
evidence for a rule of customary internationallaw,53 but nothing 
49. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780. 
50. 327 u.s. 1 (1946). 
51. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Whether that standard is really so difficult to meet is de· 
batable. See Julian G. Ku & John C. Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Func-
tional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. Cr. REV. 153, 169-70. 
52. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 {plurality opinion.). 
53. The U.S. government appears to have recognized Article 75 as an "articulation 
of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled." William H. 
Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9111: Some Salient Fealllres, 28 YALE J. INT'L 
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in that provision actually requires an accused to be privy to all 
evidence against hirn.54 
In sum, Justice Stevens's foray into the interpretation of 
customary international law lacked a consistent interpretive 
methodology. In doing so, his opinion failed to offer a persuasive 
basis for rejecting conspiracy as a violation of the law of war but 
accepting the "right to be present" as a rule of customary inter-
national law (or vice versa). It also demonstrates the majority's 
lack of capacity in a highly technical area long given to the po-
litical branches. Justice Stevens missed the fundamental point 
that much of the law of war is customary, not written. Prosecu-
tions of Nazi leaders at the Nuremburg war crimes trial for the 
crime of aggression did not violate any written international 
criminal code. Rather, American officials such as Justice Robert 
Jackson said the aggressive war was an international common 
law crime. Justice Stevens failure to understand that the crime of 
conspiracy might be part of the customary laws of war under-
mines the precedent of Nuremburg and the main engine of de-
velopment for the law of war. 
B. THE MISSING DEFERENCE DOCTRINES 
Even putting to one side the weaknesses of the Court's 
holdings, it should be clear that its readings of the substantive 
law are hardly the only plausible interpretations that exist. 
Against each of Justice Stevens's interpretations of the UCMJ, 
the Geneva Conventions, and customary international law, the 
government offered a reasonable (and often a more than rea-
sonable) alternative interpretation. 
The existence of such reasonable alternatives should have 
tipped the balance in favor of the government. Well-settled doc-
trines require the deference of courts to executive interpreta-
tions of the certain laws relating to foreign affairs. Yet Justice 
Stevens's opinion barely acknowledges the existence or rele-
vance of these doctrines much less justify his departure from 
them. 
L. 319, 322 (2003). 
54. Article 75 does require an accused to have the right to examine witnesses, but it 
does not suggest that any and all evidence used against him must be disclosed. See Proto-
col Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75 para. 4, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 37-38. 
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1. Statutory Deference 
For instance, the core of Justice Stevens's opinion rests on 
his interpretations of Articles 21 and 36 of the UCMJ, a federal 
statute. But those provisions are plainly the kind of statute to 
which the executive's interpretations should be given broad def-
erence. There is a formal doctrine explaining why. 
Since at least the Supreme Court's seminal decision in 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, courts have 
given deference to reasonable executive interpretations of am-
biguous statutes.55 As the Supreme Court has explained more 
recently, courts will give the executive branch agencies two kinds 
of interpretive deference. Where the executive has not been 
delegated lawmaking power under a statute, executive branch 
interpretations of the statute will be granted "respect according 
to its persuasiveness. "56 The level of such deference depends on 
whether the executive branch is specially charged with adminis-
tering the statute. 
But where Congress has intended for the executive agency's 
interpretations to have the "force of law," courts will give abso-
lute deference to an executive agency's reasonable interpreta-
tions of an ambiguous statute.57 Even if Congress has not ex-
pressly delegated lawmaking authority, courts may be required 
to give Chevron deference if it is "apparent from the agency's 
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances 
that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with 
the force of law."58 In Chevron itself, for instance, the Court 
gave absolute deference to the Environmental Protection 
Agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision de-
spite the fact that the statute did not expressly delegate any in-
terpretive authority to that agency. 
Chevron deference is particularly necessary, courts have 
recognized, when statutory delegations overlap with the execu-
tive's inherent constitutional powers. For instance, courts have 
interpreted statutes to avoid conflicts with the President's gen-
eral power to conduct foreign and military affairs. 59 As the Court 
55. For discussion of the linkage between Chevron and foreign affairs doctrines, see 
Bradley, supra note 25. 
56. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
57. Id. at 229. 
58. /d. 
59. See Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 102-D3 (1988) (reading statutory removal pro-
cedures to avoid limiting executive authority to remove employees for national security 
reasons); Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1988) (deferring to Ex-
196 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:179 
has recognized, "the generally accepted view [is] that foreign 
policy was the province and responsibility of the Executive. "60 
Moreover, the President is designated by the Constitution as the 
"Commander in Chief" of the military. As courts have recog-
nized, statutes intruding on these inherent constitutional powers 
should be construed to avoid encroaching or limiting these in-
herent powers.61 Indeed, Cass Sunstein has even suggested, for 
statutes relating to the use of armed force, that the executive 
should receive a "kind of super-strong deference" deriving from 
a combination of Chevron and his constitutional responsibilities 
to command the U.S. armed forces. 62 
There is little doubt that the executive's interpretations of 
the UCMJ provisions here deserved substantial deference under 
the Chevron doctrine. The plain text of Article 36(a) delegates 
lawmaking authority with respect to the rules and procedures 
governing military commissions to the President. Even without 
this express delegation, the President's power to interpret this 
statute would deserve deference due to his inherent constitu-
tional powers as Commander in Chief. Moreover, Article 36(b) 
does not revoke or limit this lawmaking authority. Following 
Chevron, the President's reasonable interpretations of Article 
36(b )'s ambiguous phrases "practicable" and "uniform" would 
normally have received the highest level of judicial deference. 
2. Treaty Deference 
Chevron deference might also be owed to the President's in-
terpretation of Article 21's limitation of military commission ju-
risdiction to violations of the "law of war." But even if no defer-
ence is owed to the interpretation of a jurisdictional provision, 
there are other formal doctrines requiring deference to treaty in-
terpretations which the Court ignored. 
The Court has long recognized that when interpreting trea-
ties, the executive branch's interpretation deserves "great 
weight. "63 The formal basis for this doctrine follows from the 
ecutive in security clearance decisions); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690--91 
(1987) (deferring to military with respect to suits for injuries related to military services). 
60. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,293-94 (1981). . 
61. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953); Burns v. Wilson, 346 
U.S. 137, 142--44 (1953) 
62. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 
2672 (2005). 
63. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982); Kolovrat 
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961). 
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President's unique constitutional power as the maker of treaties 
under Article II. Unlike federal statutes, the President is primar-
ily responsible for drafting and negotiating a treaty subject only 
to the Senate's advice and consent. The executive branch's posi-
tion is reinforced by its constitutional responsibility as the "sole 
organ"64 of the United States in its foreign relations, which re-
quire it to interpret international law, including treaties, on a 
daily basis. 
Scholars have debated the extent of deference owed to ex-
ecutive branch interpretations of treaties.65 As David Bederman 
has pointed out, the views of the executive appear to be the 
greatest single predictor of the outcome of Supreme Court treaty 
interpretations since World War 11.66 But even scholars who ar-
gue for limited judicial deference appear to concede that the 
President is owed greater deference for treaties over which he 
has an inherent constitutional responsibility, such as military af-
fairs.67 
The Geneva Conventions appear to be just such a treaty be-
cause they clearly implicate the President's inherent authority as 
commander in chief to administer the detention of enemy com-
batants. Unlike private law treaties which are intended to foster 
private transactions, the Geneva Conventions are intended to be 
administered and implemented by state-to-state or military-to-
military contacts. This is reflected both in the plain text of the 
Geneva Conventions, and also in the fact that the treaties had 
never been directly applied by the Supreme Court or any other 
federal court prior to Hamdan. 
3. Customary International Law 
In addition to giving deference to reasonable presidential 
interpretations of treaties, courts have generally provided an 
even greater level of deference to presidential interpretations of 
customary international law. The formal basis for such deference 
64. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
65. Compare Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1263 (2002), with John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missle 
Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001) 
(reviewing FRANCES FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR 
WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (2000)). 
66. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 953 (1994). 
67. Van Alstine, supra note 65, at 1301 ("On delicate matters of international di-
plomacy and national defense, the structural advantages and resultant expertise of the 
executive may support substantial deference on treaty interpretation matters."). 
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is two-fold. First, unlike statutes and treaties, customary interna-
tional law's status as a form of federal or supreme law has been 
uncertain and contested for much of U.S. history. Indeed, in 
many instances, courts have treated customary international law 
as a form of common law, even state common law, which may 
not bind the federal government. Second, the Court has recog-
nized that the President's structural position as the chief inter-
locutor of foreign policy on behalf of the United States gives him 
a unique control over the development of customary interna-
tional law. In particular, the Court has held that customary in-
ternational law may be overridden by a statute, treaty, or "con-
trolling executive or legislative act."68 
For this reason, courts have often deferred to presidential 
determinations under customary international law. The most 
powerful example of such judicial deference can be found in the 
area of head of state immunity. Courts have generally given 
presidential determinations of head of state immunity absolute 
deference.69 Such deference was only ended by a subsequent 
congressional statute. 
The Court's most recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain preserved a substantial and important role for federal 
courts in the interpretation of customard international law in the 
context of lawsuits brought by aliens.7 The Court's holding in 
that case did not address the "controlling executive act" doc-
trine. It did, however, suggest that presidential determinations of 
the foreign policy effects of accepting certain customary interna-
tional law cases is due "substantial weight." 
The Justices who sought to interpret customary interna-
tional law as the law of war, therefore, should have discussed its 
duty to defer to executive interpretations of customary interna-
tional law. As we explained, above, however, the four Justices 
who sought to interpret customary international law failed to 
even acknowledge these longstanding precedents. 
* * * 
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court and for the plurality 
could and should have acknowledged these widely-accepted du-
ties of deference to executive branch interpretations of foreign 
68. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700--01 (1900). 
69. For a discussion of the court's deference in head of state immunity determina-
tions, see Ku & Y oo, supra note 51, at 206 n.204. 
70. 542 u.s. 692 (2004). 
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affairs law. It did not do so, suggesting either that such doctrines 
will no longer be observed by the Court or the lengths to which 
the Hamdan majority was willing to go to reach its desired result. 
But the duty of deference to executive interpretations of foreign 
affairs law has a sound functional as well as formal basis. 
II. 
This Part offers a functional justification for doctrines re-
quiring deference to the executive's interpretation of foreign af-
fairs laws. It argues that the design and operation of the judiciary 
gives it a comparatively weak institutional vantage point from 
which to make decisions in the area of foreign affairs. This does 
not mean that the executive branch is infallible or that federal 
courts have no role. Rather, we are making the second-order ar-
gument that as a matter of institutional competence, the federal 
judiciary suffers significant disadvantages in resolving ambigui-
ties in laws relating to foreign affairs when compared to the Ex-
ecutive Branch. 
A. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE: THE JUDICIARY 
While courts are the primary institutions in the U.S. system 
for interpreting and applying laws, some of their key institutional 
characteristics undercut their ability in the foreign affairs law 
context. In particular, courts have access to limited information 
in foreign affairs cases and are unable to take into account the 
broader factual context underlying the application of laws in 
such areas. 
These limitations are not a failing. They are part of the in-
herent design of the federal court system, which is intended to be 
independent from politics, to allow parties to drive litigation in 
particular cases, and to receive information in highly formal and 
limited ways. While these characteristics are helpful for the pur-
poses of neutral decisionmaking, they also may render courts 
less effective tools in resolving ambiguities in laws designed to 
achieve national goals in international relations. 
Courts do not actively gather information about a particular 
case or a particular law. Rather, that information is provided to 
them by the contending parties, in many cases through the ex-
pensive process of discovery. Any information provided to the 
court for evidentiary purposes must survive rules that impose 
tests for relevance, credibility, and reliability that are designed to 
ensure fairness toward the contending parties. In the criminal 
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context, such information is further limited to prevent violating a 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
By contrast, the executive branch itself collects a wide vari-
ety of information through its own institutional experts and a 
wide global network of contacts without the necessity of strict 
rules of evidentiary exclusion. While this information may be 
presented to the executive branch at any time, a court generally 
cannot account for new information except in the context of a 
new case.71 Courts also cannot update statutory mandates tore-
flect new information, but instead must continue to enforce poli-
cies even when they are no longer appropriate. For instance, 
once the political branches have enacted a statute or approved a 
treaty, the courts cannot alter or refuse to execute those laws, 
even if the original circumstances that gave rise to the statute or 
treaty have changed or even if the national interest would be 
harmed.72 
Aside from the judiciary's information-gathering limita-
tions, there are strong reasons to doubt the ability of the mem-
bers of the federal judiciary to resolve effectively foreign affairs 
laws ambiguities. Judges are not chosen based on their expertise 
in a particular field. Federal judges, with a few minor exceptions, 
handle a wide variety of cases without any subject matter spe-
cialties. None, for instance, is chosen because of his or her exper-
tise on matters relating to foreign affairs or foreign affairs laws. 
Courts are also highly decentralized. With 94 district courts 
and. 667 judges, differing interpretations of ambiguous foreign 
affairs laws could result in broad conflicts between different ju-
dicial districts. Although the appellate process can eventually 
unify inconsistent interpretations, the process is notoriously slow 
and limited. The Supreme Court itself hears about 70-85 cases a 
year compared to the estimated 325,000 appeals that are filed 
from district court decisions annually. As a result, the system is 
poorly designed for achieving a speedy and unified interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statute, treaty, or rule of customary inter-
national law. 
Such inflexibility surely advances the goals of a domestic le-
gal system in uniformity, predictability, and stability in the inter-
pretation and application of federal law. For these reasons, def-
71. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic 
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643 (2000). 
72. For a contrary view, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE 
OF STATUTES (1982). 
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erence doctrines do not require judicial abdication to the execu-
tive branch. Rather, they typically allow the courts to make the 
initial judgment about the proper meaning of a statute or treaty. 
Where such statutes or treaties are ambiguous or broadly 
phrased, however, a continued resort to a rigid, slow, inflexible 
and decentralized decisionmaking process based upon limited 
information is hard to justify. 
This is not to say that courts could not interpret ambiguous 
statutes if necessary. Rather, the central question is, from a 
comparative institutional perspective, whether there is reason to 
think that courts would be equal or superior to other branches of 
government in resolving ambiguities in laws designed to achieve 
national foreign policies. 
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMPETENCE 
If the judiciary is not the ideal institution for resolving am-
biguities in foreign affairs laws, the deference doctrines may still 
not be worth following if the executive branch does not possess 
any advantages over the courts. We believe, however, that the 
executive branch has superior institutional competence that jus-
tifies the existence of the deference doctrines. 
As Chevron recognized, 73 the executive branch possesses 
two institutional characteristics that make it superior to courts in 
the interpretations of certain kinds of laws. First, executive 
agencies usually possess expertise in the administration of cer-
tain statutes, particularly those in complex areas. Second, the ex-
ecutive branch is subject to greater political accountability than 
the judiciary, and the electorate could ultimately change un-
wanted interpretations.74 As Justice Stevens himself explained in 
Chevron, "Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of 
either political branch of the Government."75 While agencies are 
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, 
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Gov-
ernment to make such policy choices-resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not re-
solve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged 
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday reali-
ties. 
73. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
74. On this point, see Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron- The Inrerseccion of Law 
and Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821 (1990). 
75. 467 U.S. at 865. 
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One way to think about the executive branch's comparative 
advantage is in terms of the likelihood of errors. Agencies which 
possess greater expertise over a complex and technical statute 
are less likely to depart from Congressional intent in their inter-
pretations of those statutes, especially ambiguous provisions in 
those statutes. While agencies may well incur greater costs in 
making those decisions, such costs reflect the likelihood that 
they will seek a broader set of information about their legal in-
terpretation than that presented to courts. Indeed, unlike courts, 
the executive branch is designed to develop specialized compe-
tence. In the area of foreign policy, the executive branch is corn-
posed of large bureaucracies solely focused on designing and 
implementing foreign policy. 
The more common criticism of the executive branch is that 
it is likely to manipulate its expertise in the service of political 
goals. While this may seem like a criticism, it is actually a virtue 
in the context of resolving ambiguities in laws implicating for-
eign affairs. Such laws nearly always implicate broad policy deci-
sions or political values and the political nature of the executive 
branch gives it advantages in making such decisions. If Congress 
leaves ambiguities in a foreign affairs statute, for instance, it is 
reasonable to assume it would prefer such ambiguities to be re-
solved by the more politically responsive institution. Indeed, it is 
doubtful that there is substantial popular support for transferring 
authority to the judiciary in cases where the law relates to how to 
deal with a serious external threat.76 
C. THE HAMDAN COURT'S INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPETENCE 
The Hamdan Court's refusal to follow (or acknowledge) the 
deference doctrines only further illustrates the institutional 
weaknesses of courts in resolving ambiguities in foreign affairs 
law. In each of its interpretive moves, the Court resolved the 
ambiguity in a statute, treaty, or customary international law 
against the government and in favor of the enemy combatant de-
tainee. 
For instance, the Court found that the President's use of 
military commissions failed the "practicability" test as used in 
Article 36(b) of the UCMJ. The Court held that "[n]othing in 
the record before us demonstrates that it would be impracticable 
76. For an extended discussion of this point, see Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of 
Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941,990 (2004). 
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to apply court-martial rules in this case."77 The Court brushed 
aside the claim that "the danger posed by international terror-
ism" could justify variance from court-martial procedures.78 
But the Court itself could give no serious content to the 
practicability requirement. It cited no precedents explaining why 
the courts allowed variance from court-martials in the past and 
what the standard for determining practicability might be in this 
context. In other words, it could not reduce the inherent ambigu-
ity in a phrase like "practicability" in this context and essentially 
relied on its own assessment of the "dangers posed by interna-
tional terrorism" to reach its decision. But the Court was in no 
position to evaluate the level of that danger because it had no 
access to information about the scope and nature of that danger 
in the context of military trials. Given its comparative institu-
tional incompetence in making that difficult assessment, the 
Court's refusal to give deference to the government's construc-
tion of "practicability" seems based less on facts and information 
and more on the majority's general impressions about the course 
of the war on terrorism. 
Similarly, the Court's non-deference to the executive 
branch's interpretation of Common Article 3 required it to as-
sess whether or not the war with AI Qaeda is an "armed conflict 
of an international character." The Court admitted that the 
phrase appeared to apply to civil wars and other purely domestic 
conflicts but relied on commentaries suggesting that the article 
should be interpreted as broadly as possible. But the nature of 
the war with AI Qaeda and its international versus domestic 
character requires more than an assessment of the meaning of 
the phrase "international character." It requires an analysis of 
the nature of the military conflict engaged in by the U.S. gov-
ernment against AI Qaeda and the likely effect of its compliance 
with Common Article 3 on its ability to wage that conflict. It 
seems obvious to conclude that the Court has little competence 
or access to information that would allow it to make such a de-
termination. 
Hamdan's enforcement of Common Article 3 also intrudes 
upon the political and diplomatic methods that had traditionally 
been used to implement the Geneva Conventions, and that were 
contemplated in the text of the treaties itself. The Geneva Con-
ventions rely upon the ICRC, not courts, to perform various ser-
77. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792. 
78. /d. 
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vices in monitoring state performance and helping to mediate 
disputes. Geneva also specifically contemplates that the state 
parties will "bring into force" its terms through "special agree-
ments." Again, the Conventions rely on political and diplomatic 
means, not judicial. Finally, some of the terms in Common Arti-
cle 3 are so vague and imprecise that they would have implied 
future executive and legislative interpretation. Geneva nowhere 
explicitly calls upon direct enforcement by domestic judiciaries 
of its terms; such an approach would have been, at the time, ut-
terly revolutionary. 
Finally, the Court's contribution to the development of cus-
tomary international law regarding conspiracy and the "right to 
be privy to all evidence" was an inherently difficult and complex 
enterprise. Despite the Court's efforts to present the "right to be 
privy to all evidence" as indisputable, its failure to cite any seri-
ous evidence of state practice concerning this right in the context 
of a military trial suggests that right is hardly well-settled as a 
matter of customary international law. Indeed, Congress re-
jected both of the Court's CIL interpretations by confirming the 
authority of military commissions to try crimes of conspiracy and 
by allocating to military commission judges broad powers to re-
view and limit the disclosure of classified evidence used against a 
defendant. 79 More broadly, the U.S. executive branch, which is 
largely responsible for directing U.S. state practice with respect 
to the law of war, is likely to have more expertise, information, 
and ability when assessing the effect of rejecting or accepting 
conspiracy as a war crime or the right to be privy to evidence on 
larger U.S. efforts to develop the law of war. 
None of this analysis, it bears repeating, suggests that the 
executive cannot make mistakes or poor judgments in the inter-
pretations of laws relating to foreign affairs. The question is 
whether it will make more mistakes or poorer judgments and 
whether it is less costly to correct its mistakes. Both institutions 
can make mistakes, but our analysis suggests courts are more 
likely to make mistakes and that the costs of reversing those mis-
takes will be substantial. As the next Part explains, the failure to 
defer to executive interpretations in the Hamdan case could sig-
79. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950v(28) (authorizing military commissions to try offenders on charges of conspiracy) 
and 10 U.S.C. § 949j(c) (authorizing military commission judge to delete "specified items 
of classified information made available to the accused" and the substitution of summa-
ries or statements admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to 
prove). 
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nificantly raise the costs for adjusting or conforming U.S. na-
tional policy toward the war on terrorism. 
III. 
Military commissions are the product of a consistent consti-
tutional practice and cooperation between the political branches 
of government. Until Hamdan, the Supreme Court remained re-
spectful of the President and Congress's efforts to set wartime 
policy on the prosecution and punishment of enemy war crimes. 
Rather than require that Congress issue a clear statement regu-
lating every aspect of military commissions, the Court used to 
defer to the working arrangement between the other branches to 
protect national security and carry out war by deferring to the 
executive's interpretation of foreign affairs laws. 
Not any more. The Hamdan Court is attempting to force a 
clear statement rule upon congressional delegations of authority 
to the President. While Hamdan could be read narrowly as ap-
plying only to military commissions, its approach essential effect, 
it requires Congress to enumerate every specific element of its 
war powers it wishes to delegate to the President. It is unlike any 
other delegation rule applied to the operations of the adminis-
trative state, which often issue regulations to advance "the public 
interest" or balance several vague statutory factors. Indeed, if 
applied to the administrative state, a rule like Hamdan's requir-
ing the specific enumeration of every specific power would grind 
the government to a halt. The Court provides no explanation for 
its unique imposition of a clear statement requirement on dele-
gated powers in the war context, and we argue that such a rule is 
inappropriate when the future circumstances of war remain un-
predictable and Congress has other tools to control executive 
power. 
A. HAMDAN'S MISGUIDED ASSUMPTION OF EXECUTIVE-
LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT 
Hamdan makes the mistake of assuming that the Bush ad-
ministration's military commissions are the result of a lack of co-
operation between the President and Congress in wartime pol-
icy. It did not address the issue whether Bush could establish the 
tribunals under his constitutional authority as Commander-in-
Chief, but limited itself to concluding that congressional authori-
zation was lacking and posed as defenders of congressional pre-
rogatives. Indeed, Justice Breyer authored a concurrence signed 
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by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg stating that the mili-
tary commissions required only an explicit statute to pass consti-
tutional muster. "Nothing prevents the President from returning 
to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary. ,so As we 
have noted, Congress provided just such a statute less than four 
months later. But what matters for our purposes is that four Jus-
tices insisted that the President needed such a statute in the first 
places1 
This conclusion stems from a misunderstanding of the man-
ner in which the President and Congress make national security 
policy. Of course, there remains serious dispute among scholars 
about whether the President can exercise independent foreign 
affairs and national security powers, with the majority view 
among foreign affairs scholars that the President must act pursu-
ant to congressional authorization and that Congress has the up-
per hand in setting policy.s2 But putting to one side the norma-
tive element of this debate, it should be undisputed that as a 
descriptive matter the President exercises broad power in these 
areas, far broader than those he has in domestic affairs. 83 Presi-
dents not only control diplomatic communications with other na-
tions, but they generally determine what the foreign policy of the 
United States shall be during their terms in office. They have 
used force abroad without congressional permission, including 
significant wars such as Korea and Kosovo, and exercise com-
plete control over the deployment of the armed forces, and their 
strategy and tactics. They sit at the head of an enormous foreign 
affairs and national security bureaucracy, with stations through-
out the world, staffed by millions of officials and soldiers with a 
budget of more than $400 billion a year. 
This does not mean that Congress's role is an empty one. It 
exercises a significant check on presidential initiatives in foreign 
affairs. Through its power of the purse and its control over the 
shape and size of the armed forces and the intelligence agencies, 
Congress can end presidential initiatives or promote them. If it 
does not agree with a war, it can cut off funds. If it does not 
agree with a long-term strategy, it can choose not to pay for the 
80. !d. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
81. /d. ("Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create mili-
tary commissions of the kind of issue here."). 
82. See, e.g., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWERS AFrER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990). 
83. For a discussion, see Yoo, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 42, at 11-
29. 
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military and equipment necessary to realize it. Congress has au-
thority over the rules governing the discipline of the military. It 
exercises powers of oversight, and the Senate confirms the pro-
motion of officers. It can enact legislation in its areas of enumer-
ated powers, the most relevant here being Congress's power 
"[t]o define and punish ... offenses against the law of nations,"84 
to "make rules concerning captures on land and water,"85 and 
"[t]o make rules for the government and regulation of the land 
and naval forces." 86 But while Congress exercises significant 
powers, it commonly plays a reactive role. Foreign policy and na-
tional security initiatives generally begin with the President, but 
require congressional cooperation to make them real. 
1. Historical Congressional-Executive Cooperation 
in the Use of Military Commissions 
Military commissions fall within the traditional patterns of 
cooperation between the President and Congress in war and na-
tional security affairs. In fact, presidential initiative and congres-
sional cooperation in establishing military commissions has a 
long pedigree in American history. Military commissions have 
served as the customary form of justice for prisoners who violate 
the laws of war. They have also acted as courts of justice during 
occupations and in times of martial law. American generals have 
used military commissions in virtually every siinificant war from 
the Revolutionary War through World War II. 7 
World War II witnessed the use of military commissions on 
an unprecedented scale, both to try war criminals and administer 
justice in occupied Germany and Japan. Military commissions 
administering law and order in occupied Germany heard hun-
dreds of thousands of cases.88 Military commissions were also ex-
84. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 10. 
85. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11. 
86. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 14. 
87. For a critical review of the history, see FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra 
note 7. See also Captain Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court's Role in Defining the 
Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals: A Study, Critique, & Proposal for Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 186 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2005); AM. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE 
LAW, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMM'NS (Jan. 4, 2002). Law 
professors have written on both sides of the issue. Compare David J. Bederman, Article 
II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REv. 825 (1993), and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002), with 
Harold Hongju Koh, Agora: Military Commissions, The Case Against Military Commis-
sions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320, 337 (2002). 
88. See Eli E. Nobleman, Military Government Courts: Law and Justice in the 
American Zone of Germany, 33 A.B.A. 1. 777,777-80 (1947); Pitman B. Potter, Editorial 
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tensively used to try enemy combatants for violating the laws of 
war, the most famous examples being the Nuremburg Tribunal 
that tried Nazi leaders after the war, and the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East that tried Japanese leaders for war 
crimes. American military commissions tried 3,000 defendants in 
Germany and 1,000 defendants in Japan for war crimes.89 Mili-
tary commissions tried members of the enemy for "terrorism, 
subversive activity, and violation of the laws of war."90 World 
War II military commissions operated both abroad and in the 
United States. Congress did not enact any statute specific to 
World War II authorizing the use of military commissions. 
In contrast to the Hamdan Court, the courts during World 
War II did not upset the arrangements established by the politi-
cal branches to govern military commissions, even though the 
Roosevelt administration acted with far less concern for proce-
dural fairness. In the case of the Nazi saboteurs, which reached 
the Supreme Court as Ex parte Quirin,91 FDR issued executive 
orders establishing the commission, defining the crimes, appoint-
ing its members, and excluding federal judicial review. The first 
executive order created the commission and defined its jurisdic-
tion over aliens or foreign residents "who give obedience to or 
act under the direction of" an enemy nation, and attempt to en-
ter the United States "preparing to commit sabotage, e~ionage, 
hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law or war."9 He also 
ordered that the Nazis be barred from any other court.93 FDR's 
second order established the procedures for the military com-
missions. It was only one paragraph long. It required "a full and 
fair trial," allowed the admission of evidence that would "have 
probative value to a reasonable man," and required a two-thirds 
vote for conviction and sentence.94 
Comments, Legal Bases and Character of Military Occupation in Germany and Japan, 43 
AM. 1. INT'L L. 312, 323 (1949). 
89. WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, AND WAR CRIMES TRIALS 5-6 (Norman E. 
Tutorow ed., 1986). 
90. A. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 833 (1948). 
91. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1942). The history of the case is described in 
LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL & AMERICAN 
LAW (2003). See also EUGENE RACHLIS, THEY CAME TO KILL: THE STORY OF EIGHT 
NAZI SABOTEURS IN AMERICA (1961); Michal R Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to 
War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MILL. REV. 59 (1980); 
David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. S. CT. HIST. 61 (1996). 
92. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942). 
93. Id. 
94. Appointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942). 
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FDR's commissions operated under Roosevelt's two execu-
tive orders alone. There were no regulations such as those de-
veloped by the Defense Department in 2003 to define the ele-
ments of the crimes that a commission can hear. A second 
Defense Department regulation established rules on the admis-
sibility of evidence, the right of cross-examination, the right 
against self-incrimination, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as 
the standard for conviction, and the right of defense counsel to 
examine any exculpatory evidence the prosecution possesses.95 
Under the Bush commissions, unlike FDR's, a unanimous vote 
was required to impose the death penalty.96 Defense Depart-
ment regulations specifically detail the crimes that can be tried. 
FDR stated only the general prohibition of "sabotage, espio-
nage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law or war," 
which could be interpreted to mean a lot of things.97 Spying to-
day, for instance, includes four different required elements-that 
the defendant in wartime sought to "collect certain informa-
tion," convey it to the enemy, and was "lurking or acting clan-
destinely, while acting under false pretenses."98 
Ex parte Quirin upheld these procedures and narrowed 
Milligan. Unlike Milligan, the saboteurs clearly had joined the 
Nazi armed forces. Chief Justice Stone's opinion found that 
Congress's creation of the existing courts-martial system, and the 
lack of any legal code specifying the laws of war, did not pre-
clude the use of military commissions.99 He read the Articles of 
War-the precursor to today's UCMJ -as authorization for mili-
tary commissions, but didn't reach the question whether FDR 
could have created them on his own. "By the Articles of War, 
and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far 
as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have 
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in 
appropriate cases." 100 Article 15 is identical to Section 821 of the 
UCMJ, enacted in 1950. 
In later World War II cases, the Supreme Court continued 
to defer to the way in which the President and Congress had 
acted with regard to military commissions. In In re Yamashita, 
95. See generally Mil. Comm'n Order No. 1, supra note 11. 
96. See Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commissions, 32 C.F.R. § 11.3 
(2003); Mil. Comm'n Order No.1, supra note 11, at paras. 5-{). 
97. See Proclamation No. 2561,7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942). 
98. See 32 C.F.R. § 11.6 (b)(6) (2003). 
99. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). 
100. !d. at 28. 
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General MacArthur ordered a military commission to try the 
commanding Japanese general in the Philippines for failing to 
prevent his troops from committing brutal atrocities and war 
crimes. 101 Chief Justice Stone again rejected the claim that the 
commissions were illegal and found military commissions au-
thorized by Congress in the Articles of War. 102 In two other 
cases, the Supreme Court refused to step in to review the convic-
tions of Japanese leaders by an international war crimes tribunal 
run by MacArthur, or to review the sentences of Germans cap-
tured in China after the end of hostilities and tried by military 
commission.103 
During World War II, this level of inter-branch cooperation 
on military commissions was sufficient to survive constitutional 
review. Congress never passed a law specifically authorizing 
military commissions in World War II. Still, the Quirin and Ya-
mashita Courts found military commissions to be approved by 
Congress. In Quirin, Chief Justice Stone wrote for a unanimous 
Court that Article 15 of the Articles of War, which Congress en-
acted in a 1916 overhaul of the rules of military justice, provided 
sufficient constitutional authorization. 104 Now Section 821 of the 
UCMJ, Article 15 declared that the creation of courts martial for 
the trial of American servicemen for violating military rules of 
discipline did not "deprive military commissions ... of concur-
rent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that ... by 
the law of war may be tried by military commissions."105 In en-
acting this provision as Article 15 of the Articles of War in 1916 
and again in 1950 as part of the UCMJ, Congress probably 
meant nothing more than to reserve to the President his existing 
101. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
102. !d. atll-12. 
103. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 
(1948). In a 1952 case in which a wife of an American serviceman in occupied Germany 
was tried by military tribunal for murdering her husband, the Supreme Court again up-
held military commissions as authorized by Congress. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 
360-62 (1952). 
104. In fact, Congress reiterated the point again in 1996 in the legislative history to 
the War Crimes Act. The Act, Congress observed, "is not intended to affect in any way 
the jurisdiction of any court-martial, military commission, or other military tribunal un-
der any article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or under the law of war or the law 
of nations." H.R. Rep. No. 104-698, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 
2177. 
105. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1956) ("The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdic-
tion upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other 
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by 
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals."). 
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authority to establish military commissions, rather than to spe-
cifically authorize them. Nonetheless, the Quirin Court read Ar-
ticle 15 as direct congressional authorization of commissions. 
Congress chose not to disturb Quirin when it re-enacted Article 
15 as part of the UCMJ. Yamashita did nothing to undermine 
this holding. 
In these cases, the Court not only deferred to the working 
relationship between the branches, but it also refused to review 
the procedures and other standards used by the commissions. 
Yamashita, for example, rejected a claim that the federal courts 
ought to determine whether military commissions, and their pro-
cedures, were militarily "necessary." This claim arose in two 
ways. General Yamashita claimed that his military commission 
trial was illegal because it took place away from the battlefield 
and after active hostilities had ceased. The Court held that the 
decision whether to proceed with a military commission in those 
circumstances was a decision for the political branches. 106 Yama-
shita then argued that the procedures used in his trial were so 
different from those used in courts-martial as to be illegal. He 
relied on Article 38 of the Articles of War, later re-enacted as 
Section 38 of the UCMJ, which requires that procedures used in 
military commissions, "in so far as [the President] shall deem 
practicable," use the rules of evidence used in federal district 
court. The Yamashita Court rejected this claim because the Arti-
cles of War did not apply to members of the enemy on trial for 
war crimes.107 The Court found that judicial review did not ex-
tend to the President's determination of procedural rules for 
military commissions.108 This analysis comports with the Court's 
later decision in Eisentrager to allow the federal courts to meas-
ure the operation of military commissions against the U.S.'s ob-
ligations under internationallaw. 109 One way to understand Eis-
entrager and Yamashita is to see these cases as examples of 
deference to the political branches on the issue of treaty imple-
mentation. The Court understood that the President and Con-
gress, which could always enact a specific statute carrying out the 
Geneva Conventions, had the superior institutional competence 
to determine best how to implement treaties that govern military 
justice and wartime detention policies. 
106. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 12-13. 
107. !d. at 18-19. 
108. !d. at 23. 
109. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 & n.14 (1950). 
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2. Modern Congressional-Executive Cooperation 
on Use of Military Commissions 
Fans of Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence110 have 
yet to explain their constitutional problems with military com-
missions. They believe that presidential power is at its height 
when acting with congressional support, which is present in the 
UCMJ (as interpreted in Quirin and Yamashita) and in Con-
gress's AUMF. 11 If the latter implicitly authorizes the detention 
of enemy combatants, as it did in Hamdi, it should also permit 
their trial by military commission. In the former, the Court read 
the AUMF as permitting the executive branch to detain enemy 
combatants in the war on terrorism without criminal charge, 
even though the AUMF's text speaks only to the use of force 
and not to detention. No specific authorization was necessary, 
however, "because detention to prevent a combatant's return to 
the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war. "112 But 
detention seems to require no more enumeration than trials for 
war crimes. Enforcing the laws of war against the enemy, which 
is the purpose of military commissions, would seem equally to be 
"a fundamental incident of waging war" and hence included 
within the AUMF. 
But the case for congressional support for military commis-
sions is even stronger than the case for military detention in 
Hamdi. In the case of commissions, Congress supplemented the 
AUMF and the UCMJ with the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act. 113 
The Act allows an appeal to the federal appeals court in Wash-
ington, D.C. of the verdict of a military commission.114 It estab-
lishes the standard of review that the federal courts are to use in 
reviewing commission decisions and the substantive legal stan-
dards. If Congress never approved of commissions in the first 
place, why would it create a review process for them? Congress 
has never shown any hostility toward military commissions, ei-
ther historically, or in the war on terrorism. Indeed, the De-
tainee Treatment Act goes well beyond the silent acquiescence 
that the Court has accepted in other cases as sufficient congres-
110. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
111. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
112. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (plurality opinion). 
113. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148 § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 
2680, 2742 (2005). 
114. !d.§ 1005(e)(3)(A). 
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sional authorization for executive action in foreign affairs,115 and 
approaches the ex post congressional authorization for Lincoln's 
extraordinary acts at the outset of the Civil War. 
Even if Congress had not authorized military commissions 
in the UCMJ, President Bush would still have authority to estab-
lish them under his constitutional authority as Commander-in-
Chief. 116 Article II of the Constitution grants the President the 
"executive power" and the job of Commander-in-Chief. While 
Congress has sometimes authorized military commissions itself, 
American history affords many examples of Presidents and mili-
tary commanders creating them without congressional legisla-
tion. The purpose of military commissions makes clear that they 
should rest within the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief. 
Waging war is not limited only to ordering which enemy forma-
tions to strike and what targets to bomb. It also involves forming 
policy on how to fight, how to detain enemy combatants, and 
how to sanction the enemy if it violates the rules of civilized war-
fare. Allowing military commanders to try and punish violators 
creates incentives for the enemy to follow the rules in the future 
and assures our own troops that war crimes will not be tolerated. 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Yamashita: 
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption 
of measures by the military commander, not only to repel and 
defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary 
measures those enemies who, in their attempt to thwart or 
impede our military effort, have violated the law of war. 117 
Military commissions help commanders properly restore order 
in the aftermath of a conflict, and this can be an important way 
of making sure fighting does not flare up again. 
These considerations may rest even more at the heart of the 
Commander-in-Chief power during the war on terrorism than in 
a conventional war between nation-states. In the latter, the 
United States wages war against an enemy with territory, popu-
lation, and regular armed forces. The fighting takes place ac-
cording to rules defined by the laws of war; the laws of war gen-
erally rely upon diplomatic and political methods to enforce 
115. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
116. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 1. There is ample historical support for a presidential 
power to convene military commissions in the absence of congressional authorization. 
The harder question is whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit the President 
from convening military commissions. 
117. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S 1, 28 
(1942)). 
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their terms. The object is to gain control of the enemy's territory 
and population and defeat its forces in order to achieve an ac-
ceptable political settlement. AI Qaeda, however, confronts the 
United States with an enemy that bears none of these traditional 
characteristics of a nation-state. Nor does it seem interested in 
engaging in political or diplomatic communications and negotia-
tions over curing any violations of the laws of war. Indeed, al 
Qaeda's main tactics-intentionally targeting civilians, taking 
and killing hostages, disguising themselves as civilians-
deliberately violate the rules of warfare. Enforcing the laws of 
war not only punishes violators, but also helps counter al 
Qaeda's tactical advantage in surprise attacks on civilians. Such 
tactics are usually in the hands of the battlefield commanders 
and ultimately the President, rather than Congress. Academics 
may continue to debate whether the President or Congress 
should decide whether to begin war, but once war has begun, our 
constitutional system has usually been content to allow the 
President as Commander-in-Chief to decide the best strategies 
and tactics to defeat the enemy. 
But one need not take sides in the war powers debate be-
tween the President and Congress to see that the Court has un-
necessarily interfered in the political branches' management of 
war. Constitutional practice shows that there has been a substan-
tial history of inter-branch interaction and cooperation on the 
subject of military commissions. Rather than a story of unilateral 
executive branch action, Congress has supported presidential use 
of them in at least three different ways: a) Section 821 of the 
UCMJ, which recognizes military commissions; b) the Authori-
zation to Use Military Force enacted on September 18, 2001, 
which authorized the President to use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those responsible for the September 11 at-
tacks; and c) the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which created 
a carefully crafted review process for military commission ver-
dicts. This is not to say that President Bush could not use mili-
tary commissions on his own authority once war broke out; sev-
eral Presidents had employed them as a wartime measure 
without any specific congressional authorization. But it was un-
necessary for the Court to reach the issue of the President's con-
stitutional powers since Congress was on record as supporting 
military commissions. Indeed, Congress's swift action to largely 
reinstate the pre-Hamdan military commissions simply confirms 
that there was no real conflict between executive and legislative 
policy in the use of military commissions. 
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CLEAR STATEMENT RULE 
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In effect, Hamdan raises the transaction costs for the mak-
ing of policy in wartime, and in fact raises them higher than ex-
ists for domestic policymaking. Courts tolerate the broad delega-
tions by Congress to the administrative state, where executive 
branch agencies sometimes make rules with legislative effect 
based only on the command that they advance the public inter-
est. Courts have yet to invalidate any such delegation as too 
vague or too broad since the days of the Supreme Court's resis-
tance to the New Deal.118 Yet, Hamdan suggests that similarly 
broad delegations will not survive in foreign affairs. This re-
verses the stance that the Court had adopted in national security 
and foreign affairs for decades. In the well-known United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., for example, the Court upheld 
Congress's delegation of authority to FDR in foreign affairs that 
it suggested that it might not in domestic affairs. In order to 
avoid serious embarrassment in foreign affairs and promote na-
tional goals, the Court found, "congressional legislation which is 
to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the 
international field must often accord to the President a degree of 
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would 
not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved." 119 
The Curtiss-Wright Court identified a number of reasons for 
judicial deference in the foreign affairs field, particularly to dele-
gations of authority to the executive. First, the Court observed, 
the President often acts in the foreign realm not just under legis-
lative authorization, "but with such an authority plus the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international re-
lations."120 Because the President has his own independent for-
118. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). For recent scholarly 
debate over the death of the non-delegation doctrine, sec Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-
Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). 
119. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). Of 
course, Curtiss-Wright has received substantial academic criticism, especially of its his-
torical theory of extra constitutional powers. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE !RAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR 94 (1990) (summarizing "withering criticism of Curtiss Wright"). But such criti-
cism, even if valid, does not take away from the practical and functional persuasiveness 
of the Court's decision. 
120. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20. 
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eign affairs power, the Curtiss-Wright majority believed, courts 
ought to adopt a deferential stance when the President and Con-
gress are acting together in an area of foreign affairs, and not be 
punctilious about which branch's power was being exercised. 
Second, the Court found that functionally that the President 
"has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which 
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of 
war."
121 Presidents can act, the Court suggested, more effectively 
in response to secret information, which demonstrates "the un-
wisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental 
power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the 
President is to be governed."122 Third, the Court found a "uni-
form, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice"123 of 
granting the President in foreign affairs power to use "his unre-
stricted judgment" or which "provide a standard far more gen-
eral than that which has always been considered requisite with 
regard to domestic affairs." 124 
A more generous attitude toward the broad delegation of 
power in the foreign affairs area is not just an artifact of the in-
ter-war period. Dames & Moore v. Regan also relied on a pos-
ture of judicial deference toward the actions of the political 
branches in foreign affairs. 125 In Dames & Moore, the Court up-
held President Carter's order suspending claims against Iran 
pending in U.S. courts to fulfill an agreement releasing US hos-
tages in Iran. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found 
that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA) specifically authorized the President to order several 
of the actions required by the agreement with Iran, such as the 
nullifying the attachment of Iranian assets and transferring them 
out of the country. 126 But IEEPA contained no similar provision 
providing for the suspension of claims. Nonetheless, the Court 
upheld the President's exercise of that power based on an ab-
sence of specific congressional disapproval and its enactment of 
IEEP A and related statutes in the general area. 
Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every 
possible action the President may find it necessary to take or 
every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of 
121. !d. at 320. 
122 !d. at 321-22. 
123. !d. at 329. 
124. !d. at 323-24. 
125. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
126. !d. at 669-74. 
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Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, "espe-
cially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security," 
imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the Ex-
ecutive.127 
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Rather than require specific congressional authorization, the 
Court found that "the enactment of legislation closely related to 
the question of the President's authority in a particular case 
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad 
discretion may be considered to 'invite' 'measures on independ-
ent presidential responsibility."' 128 
Hamdan upsets the Court's traditional doctrine of deferring 
to the delegation of authority, or power-sharing, in foreign af-
fairs and national security. It makes little sense to increase trans-
action costs to cooperation between the branches in war and for-
eign affairs. First, from a formal perspective, the President has 
greater independent constitutional powers when foreign affairs 
and war are concerned than during peacetime. The September 
11 attacks triggered the President's Commander-in-Chief power, 
which would provide him with broader authority to make policy 
decisions, of both the strategic and tactical level, than in peace-
time. Even if one believes that only Congress can authorize wars, 
Congress authorized this one when it enacted the AUMF. At the 
very least, it seems that the need for a clear statement rule 
weighted against delegations of authority is out of place in an 
area, such as war and national security, where the President pos-
sesses greater constitutional authority and the dividing line be-
tween the branches' authorities is unclear. 
Second, the goals of the separation of powers are not ad-
vanced by more intrusive judicial review over warmaking. In the 
domestic context, the Court has identified the preservation of 
individual liberty as an important goal of the separation of pow-
ers. As the Court observed in Bowsher v. Synar, the Framers be-
lieved that the separation of powers would prevent any single 
branch of the government from expanding its power to threaten 
the freedoms of its citizens. 129 "Even a cursory examination of 
the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis 
that checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of 
government that would protect liberty." 130 This echoed James 
127. ld. at 678 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)). 
128. ld. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
129. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,721-22 (1986). 
130. I d. at 722. 
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Madison's explanation in The Federalist for the interlocking na-
ture of the separation of powers and federalism. Due to the divi-
sion of power between the branches of the federal government, 
and then between the federal government and the states, "a 
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different 
governments will controul each other; at the same time that each 
will be controuled by itself. "131 
Threats to individual freedoms, especially the individual 
freedoms of enemy aliens, are not the primary concern when the 
government is fighting a foreign enemy that threatens the basic 
security of the nation. In wartime the government may reduce 
the individual liberties of even citizens in order to more effec-
tively fight the war, and it has longstanding authority to dramati-
cally curtail the rights of non-citizens. A wartime government 
may even pursue policies that, in retrospect, appear to be an 
over-reaction to the threat. But our constitutional system places 
the interest in effectively waging war first. As Alexander Hamil-
ton wrote in The Federalist, because "the circumstances which 
may affect the public safety are [not] reducible within certain de-
terminate limits; ... it must be admitted, as a necessary conse-
quence, that there can be no limitation of that authority, which is 
to provide for the defence and protection of the community, in 
any matter essential to its efficacy. "132 James Madison agreed 
that the federal government had to possess all of the powers 
necessary to defend the country. "Security against foreign dan-
ger is one of the primitive objects of civil society .... The powers 
requisite for attaining it, must be effectually confided to the fed-
eral councils."133 The limits of this power could not be defined 
precisely. Wrote Hamilton: the federal government should pos-
sess "an indefinite power of providing for emergencies as they 
might arise." 134 The Framers did not appear to believe that a 
strict reading of the separation of powers ought to be applied to 
the federal government's decisions in wartime, when the benefit 
to the nation as a whole in defeating the enemy would be ad-
vanced by cooperation between the branches. 
Third, the Court is not protecting Congress's prerogatives in 
demanding that it specifically authorize presidential action in 
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
132. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147-48 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed, 1961). 
133. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 269 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 211 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
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war. As positive political theorists have argued, Congress's col-
lective action problems and the rational self-interests of its 
members in re-election make it difficult for the legislature to act 
in certain areas where uncertainty is high, information and ex-
pertise are expensive, and there may be costly political repercus-
sions from the decision. 135 Political scientists have found that the 
greatest degree of delegation will occur in the area of foreign af-
fairs and national security, and that this is also an area where we 
would expect to see more unilateral presidential action accom-
panied by congressional acquiescence. Legislators are more 
likely to set no policy of their own or to delegate broadly to the 
executive branch when high risks are involved over which they 
have little control, which perhaps better describes war than any 
other area of human conduct. Because of these political impera-
tives, the executive and legislative branches have settled on a 
stable system that provides broad delegation to the President in 
foreign affairs and national security. Hamdan identifies no bene-
fits for United States war policies in overthrowing this arrange-
ment, fails to grapple with the costs in higher transaction costs 
and greater uncertainty it has created, and does not ask whether 
its new clear statement rule will actually correct mistakes in 
identifying popular wishes. If they were to be consistent, fans of 
functionalism in separation of powers analysis ought to rue a de-
cision like Hamdan. 
Fourth, enforcing a strict approach to delegation does not 
adequately address the situation presented by war. Hamdan's 
clear statement rule essentially chooses a rule over a standard in 
delegating power. 136 A typical rule is a speed limit of 55 miles per 
hour. Rules reduce decision costs because they are clear and 
easy to apply; they create legal certainty because of greater pre-
dictability; and they require less information to implement. 
Rules, however, do not allow a careful application of law to all 
relevant facts, and so they are inevitably overinclusive or under-
inclusive.137 A standard that aimed at the same goal as a speed 
limit could simply prohibit driving unreasonably fast under the 
135. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE 
POWERS 73~77 (1999). See generally WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT 
PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (2003). 
136. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 30--36 
(1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Adrian Ver-
meule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L REV. 74,91 n.68 (2000) (collecting sources). 
137. See Vermeule, supra note 136, at 91. 
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conditions. Standards, which allow for consideration of more fac-
tors and facts, increase decision costs, but reduce error costs. 
Consideration of a greater variety of factors will reduce the un-
derinclusiveness or overinclusiveness of the law, but it will re-
quire more information to apply and lead to less predictability 
and more uncertainty ex ante. 
Rules and standards also bear differences in the discretion 
available to the decisionmaker at the time of implementation. 
The delegator of power may choose a rule if it believes future 
decisionmakers will make mistakes or will not have access to 
good information. 138 A rule gives more authority to those who 
write the law by narrowing the discretion of future decisionmak-
ers. A standard is superior when the decisionmaker enjoys 
greater competence and has access to better information at the 
time an actual case arises. Standards vest more authority in those 
who apply the law to a given case, rather than those who wrote 
the law. 
Under this approach, narrow delegations governed by strict 
rules and clear statement requirements make the most sense 
when Congress enjoys superior decisionmaking abilities and has 
access to superior information at the time it writes the law. It 
should use a rule when narrowing discretion will not produce 
large numbers of errors, or when it believes that the President 
has poor decisionmaking abilities. Such an approach will save 
decision-making costs once power is delegated because the ex-
ecutive branch will not have to expend significant resources in 
application of the delegation power. But it requires Congress to 
predict with high certainty the universe of future cases, and draft 
rules in anticipation of them. Broad delegations, on the other 
hand, will make more sense if Congress cannot foresee the pos-
sible situations. A President acting within wide boundaries of 
delegated power will be able to better fit policy to the circum-
stances at hand, though at higher decisionmaking costs. 
Employing a strict rule over a standard has certain costs and 
benefits, ones that are mismatched for wartime. War is perhaps 
the most extreme example of an issue where the executive 
branch will have available superior information than the legisla-
ture, and it will be able to make decisions swiftly, in contrast to a 
Congress that will suffer from collective action problems and will 
be averse to making politically risky choices. War is also perhaps 
the most inherently unpredictable of human activities. Unless 
138. See id. at 92-93. 
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Congress is confident that it can predict the enemy's strategies 
and tactics, a rule based delegation makes little sense. Finally, 
the costs of errors in war are extremely high. Delegation by strict 
rule will produce higher rates of error than a standard. Given the 
lives that could be lost and the damage to national security that 
could be suffered from mistaken policies, it seems clear that the 
area of war requires delegations which provide the executive 
branch with broad discretion. 
Hamdan, by contrast, applies the opposite principle. It im-
poses a requirement that Congress act through rules when it at-
tempts to delegate its powers in war to the President. It effec-
tively rejected the standards approach exemplified by the 
AUMF and Hamdi. The Court's clear statement rule, however, 
does not appear to promote any specific policy which is ex-
plained as being more important or valuable than flexibility in 
wartime. As William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have observed, 
clear statement rules embody policy choices by the Court, such 
as the rule of lenity's protection for criminal defendants. 139 If 
anything, they have argued, in past cases the Court had applied 
clear statement rules to wotect the executive's prerogatives in 
managing foreign affairs. 40 Hamdan fails to explain what policy 
value is enhanced by reversing this rule to impose a clear state-
ment rule on wartime policy, and why that value outweighs the 
benefits of flexibility in war decisions. 
Hamdan does not bode well for the United States's ability 
to wage war effectively. It increases the costs of conducting hos-
tilities by making it more difficult for the President and Congress 
to cooperate. Congress may enumerate powers more specifically, 
but at the cost of flexibility-presidential ability to shape deci-
sions to the circumstances at hand will be constrained. Or, as it 
did in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Congress may 
largely restore the President's discretion to run military commis-
sions, but it will do so at the cost in time and energy of develop-
ing and enacting complicated legislation. Indeed, without con-
gressional action, Hamdan would have simply resulted in 
blocking war crimes trials altogether, leaving enemy combatants 
detained for the duration of the conflict. 
139. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 V AND. L. REV. 593 (1992). 
140. !d. at 615-19. 
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C. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006: CONGRESS 
RETURNS TO THE STATUS QUO 
Congressional disagreement with Hamdan is reflected in the 
drastic measures it took to quickly overrule the decision. Not 
only does the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) reject 
Hamdan's reading of the relevant statutes, treaties, and custom-
ary international laws of war, but the MCA also strips federal 
courts of any future jurisdiction over cases challenging the use of 
military commissions while at the same time re-confirming its in-
tent to delegate broad powers to the executive branch. The 
MCA's efforts to remove courts from the business of interpret-
ing foreign affairs laws suggest that Congress is seeking to return 
to the pre-Hamdan system of presidential-legislative cooperation 
in the administration of wartime policies. 
Thus, the MCA reversed, without almost no debate, the 
Hamdan court's insistence that military commissions must follow 
court-martial procedures unless impracticable and the limitation 
of such commissions to offenses against the law of war. Instead, 
the MCA specifically authorizes the President to convene com-
missions as authorized by the chapter as well as in violation of 
the law of war. 141 It also prohibits courts from usin?, court-
martial procedures to bind or limit military commissions. 42 
Additionally, Congress reversed all of the Hamdan court's 
interpretations of the international law save one. As discussed, 
Congress rejected with almost no debate the Hamdan plurality's 
extended and complex analysis of the customary international 
law of war in the context of conspiracy charges and defendants' 
rights. While Congress did accept the Hamdan court's applica-
tion of Common Article 3 to the war with Al Qaeda, Congress 
announced that, contrary to the Hamdan court's interpretations, 
military commissions satisfied Common Article 3's requirement 
of a regularly constituted court. It codified "grave breaches" of 
that article for purposes of the War Crimes Act but then dele-
141. See 10 U .S.C. § 948(b) ("The President is authorized to establish military com-
missions under this chapter for offenses triable by military commission .. . ").See also 10 
U .S.C. § 948d ("A military commission under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to try 
any offense made punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an 
alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001."). 
142. See 10 USC§ 948b(c) ("Chapter 47 [governing court-martials) ... does not by 
its terms apply to trial by military commission except as specifically provided in this chap-
ter.) 
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gated the exclusive authority to define other breaches of Com-
mon Article 3 to the President. 143 
Most importantly, congressional reaction to Hamdan went 
far beyond reversing the Court's substantive result. Instead, 
Congress took unusually aggressive measures to ensure that the 
Court would no longer interfere with executive-legislative coop-
eration in the administration of military commissions. Thus, in 
addition to delegating to the President broad and exclusive au-
thority to define non-grave breaches of Common Article 3, the 
MCA prohibits the use of the Geneva Conventions as a source 
of rights for alien enemy combatants in a military commission 
trial. The MCA further prohibits courts from using "foreign or 
international law" as a rule of decision in the interpretation of 
the Geneva Convention obligations.144 Finally, in the MCA's 
most controversial provision, Congress removed the jurisdiction 
of federal courts to "hear or consider an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the 
United States who has been determined by the United States to 
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is await-
ing such determination. "145 
This last provision is almost certainly going to be subject to 
extended litigation to the extent it purports to suspend the writ 
of habeas corpus for aliens detained as enemy combatants within 
the territorial United States. 146 But whether or not it is ulti-
mately upheld, it reflects Congress' strong desire to eliminate ju-
dicial interference in the administration of wartime laws and 
policies. It is hard to imagine such an aggressive effort to remove 
federal court jurisdiction and to limit judicial interpretive powers 
would have occurred had the Hamdan Court not departed so 
dramatically from the traditional doctrines of judicial deference 
to executive-legislative wartime policies. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have long recognized a duty to defer to the executive 
branch's reasonable interpretations of statutes relating to foreign 
affairs, treaties, and customary international law. Such deference 
143. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L 109-, Section 7(a)(2) and (3). 
144. ld. 
145. Id. at Section 7(a)(e)(l). 
146.. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ("All agree that, absent suspension, 
the wnt of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the 
United States."). 
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doctrines have a solid formal pedigree in well-settled precedents 
as well as the Constitution's structural allocation of foreign af-
fairs and warmaking powers to the executive branch. The Ham-
dan decision represents a remarkable and troubling departure 
from these longstanding precedents. Instead of deferring to the 
executive branch's reasonable interpretations, the Court 
adopted its own barely reasonable interpretations in order to in-
validate the President's existing system of military commissions. 
The Court did not offer a justification, either formal or 
functional, for its new approach to the interpretation of foreign 
affairs laws. Even putting aside the very strong formal basis for 
the deference doctrines, the functional basis for requiring judi-
cial deference to executive interpretations of foreign affairs laws 
is even stronger. Courts are poorly positioned, from the stand-
point of institutional competence, to resolve ambiguities in stat-
utes, treaties, and customary international law that govern the 
conduct of national policy in times of war. Courts lack expertise 
and access to crucial information when acting in these areas. 
Perhaps most importantly, courts lack the flexibility to adjust or 
revise decisions when the factual context for its decision has 
changed. In all of these circumstances, the Executive has greater 
(although not infallible) abilities to resolve ambiguities in the in-
terpretation of these laws. 
The Hamdan Court may have believed it was upholding the 
position of Congress by imposing a clear statement rule requir-
ing specific congressional delegations of authority to the Presi-
dent in the conduct of military affairs. Such a clear statement 
rule, however, actually disrupted the normal and longstanding 
pattern of congressional-executive cooperation in the use of mili-
tary commissions. Congress acted on numerous occasions to 
delegate broad authority to the President to conduct the war 
against Al Qaeda and to try alleged terrorists through military 
commissions. Congress acted against a background of many 
similarly broad delegations to Presidents in the use of military 
commissions throughout U.S. history. Yet the Court decided 
that this uninterrupted pattern of political cooperation was no 
longer sufficient, and that clear statements are now required for 
every particular presidential action in the war on terrorism. 
Congress acted once again after Hamdan to reiterate its support 
for the use of military commissions and, perhaps in exasperation 
with the Court, largely stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction 
to hear further challenges to the military commission system. 
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The long-term jurisprudential significance of Hamdan is still 
difficult to assess. The decision's non-constitutional basis, fol-
lowed by its quick repudiation by Congress, makes it unlikely it 
will reach the canonical heights of Youngstown or Nixon, but it 
will no doubt be remembered as one of the two leading cases 
arising out of the war against terrorism. It should also be re-
membered as a rare example of judicial interference into the po-
litical branches' conduct of a war that proves an exception rather 
than a rule, especially after the President and Congress, in the 
course of expending significant political time and energy, over-
ruled much of Hamdan's reasoning and result. 
